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1 Abstract
This paper acts as a collection of various trading strategies and useful pieces of market information that might
help to implement such strategies. This list is meant to be comprehensive (though by no means exhaustive)
and hence we only provide pointers and give further sources to explore each strategy further. To set the
stage for this exploration, we consider the factors that determine good and bad trades, the notions of market
efficiency, the real prospect amidst the seemingly high expectations of homogeneous expectations from human
beings and the catch-22 connotations that arise while comprehending the true meaning of rational investing.
We can broadly classify trading ideas and client market color material into Delta-One and Derivative strategies
since this acts as a natural categorization that depends on the expertise of the various trading desks that will
implement these strategies. For each strategy, we will have a core idea and we will present different flavors of
this central theme to demonstrate that we can easily cater to the varying risk appetites, regional preferences,
asset management styles, investment philosophies, liability constraints, investment horizons, notional trading
size, trading frequency and other preferences of different market participants.
As an illustrative example, we consider in detail an investment strategy, titled “The Bounce Basket”, designed
for someone to express a bullish view on the market by allowing them to take long positions on securities that
would benefit the most from a rally in the markets. The central idea of this theme is to identity securities
from a regional perspective that are heavily shorted and yet are fundamentally sound with at least a minimum
buy rating from a consensus of stock analysts covering the securities.
2 To Trade or Not to Trade
We can broadly classify trading ideas or strategies (Pardo 2011; Nekrasov 2014; End-note 1) and market
color (Merkley, Michaely & Pacelli 2017; Cheng, Liu & Qian 2006; Groysberg, Healy & Chapman 2008;
Schipper 1991; Williams, Moyes & Park 1996; End-note 2, 3, 4) material into Delta-One and Derivative
strategies (generally, the price of Delta one securities have a one to one correspondence with the price of the
underlying: Natenberg 1994; Hull & Basu 2016; End-notes 5, 6), since this acts as a natural categorization
that depends on the expertise of the various trading desks that will implement these strategies. For each
strategy, we will have a core idea and it is very straight forward to present different flavors of this central
theme that can easily cater to the varying risk appetites, regional preferences, asset management styles,
investment philosophies, liability constraints, investment horizons, notional trading size, trading frequency
and other preferences of different market participants. Once we have some market color or a possible trading
idea, the conundrum seen in the title of this section presents itself, which is whether to implement it and
how exactly; we address some of these concerns through the rest of this article.
As the number of securities in any trading idea is varied, the error in the expected returns, the variance of
returns, the benefits of diversification and the liquidity constraints will vary (risk, return, diversification and
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liquidity are discussed in: Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2014; Elton, Gruber, Brown & Goetzmann 2009). Hence,
it is important to consider different number of securities as different variations of the core strategy. The
costs of implementing the strategy will also vary with the number of securities and other parameters used to
create the strategy. Hence, it is important to explicitly calculate these figures for different variations of the
core strategy (for trading costs see: Perold 1998; Almgren & Neil 2001; Kashyap 2016b).
The Execution Risk and the Post Execution Portfolio risk of the strategy will depend on the Market Impact,
Market Risk and the Timing of the executions that make up the strategy (Kashyap 2016b). Ways to achieve
optimality in this regard are elaborated below in the “Risk and Best Execution Advisory” point 10. Any
investment firm that already has some of these trading strategies, can look for supplementary information
to improve the pre and post trading experience. Combination strategies (or cross-trading) is possible when
implementing two strategies reduces the overall market exposure and hence the risk of the blended strategies.
Also, in certain cases, once we implement one strategy, the additional cost and the risk to implement another
strategy, (marginal cost and risk) is significantly less and hence it is can be demonstrated that it is beneficial
to implement multiple strategies.
These ideas can be implemented mostly with data available from Bloomberg (Bloomberg 1981; End-note 7)
or other market data vendors. If additional information is required it is mentioned along with the specific
trading idea (we might be able to supplement any basic data set with specialized data sources). A statistical
tool like MATLAB (Window 2010; End-notes 8, 9; a basic database to maintain the time-series data and
other information would be a prudent investment as well) would be required to perform the regressions and
other computations to back-test (Bailey, Borwein, de Prado & Zhu 2014) the strategies, estimate the risk
and Profit and Loss (P&L) levels on these strategies. For the sake of brevity and to keep this document
simply as an overview of the possibilities, the computational complexities and implementation details have
been abstracted away from the individual strategy sections below. As it will become clear, the design and
implementation of these strategies will require personnel with quantitative skills and training in mathematics
as it applies to finance and economics, hence the title “The Benefits of Friendship with Quantitative Analysts
and Financial Engineers”.
This paper acts as a collection of various trading strategies and useful pieces of market information that might
help to implement such strategies. This list is meant to be comprehensive (though by no means exhaustive)
and hence we only provide pointers and give additional sources to explore each strategy further. To set the
stage for this exploration, we consider the factors that determine good and bad trades, the notions of market
efficiency, the real prospect amidst the seemingly high expectations of homogeneous expectations from human
beings and the catch-22 connotations that arise while comprehending the true meaning of rational investing.
We consider in detail an investment strategy, titled “The Bounce Basket” in section (5). This can be beneficial
when we expect the market to rebound after a slump or after a bad economic cycle. This strategy acts as a
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complete numerical illustration of the general principles behind trading strategies discussed in sections (3; 4
).
3 Good Ideas, Bad Trades ... Ugly Risks
We can represent the investment process as a dotted circle since there is a lot of ambiguity in the various
steps involved. The circle also indicates the repetitive nature of many steps that are continuously carried out
while investing. If we consider the entire investment management procedure as being akin to connecting the
dots of a circle, then the Circle of Investment can be represented as a dotted circle with many dots falling
approximately on the circumference, but it hard to have an exact clue about the exact location of the center
or the length of the radius.
The Equity asset class holds the potential for unlimited upside and brings with it partial ownership of the
firm and hence some influence over the decision making process. It can be argued that this premise of
boundless profits, coupled with limited losses or liability and a certain degree of control, make this asset class
an extremely appealing one, contributing to its immense popularity. Hence, the strategies discussed below are
more immediately applicable to the stocks markets, but it is fairly straight forward to extend them to other
asset classes (for foreign exchange and fixed income securities, see: Copeland 2008; Tuckman & Serrat 2011).
The various asset classes can be compared to balloons tethered to the ground, with the equity balloon having
the weakest connections to the ground and also the weakest controls to guide it, if it is wind-borne. The lack
of a strong controlling factor also makes regime changes much harder to detect for equities (regime changes
are a major shift in the investment landscape: Wade 2008; Angeletos, Hellwig & Pavan 2007; Gasiorowski
1995).
We need to keep in mind that good traders can make bad trades and bad traders can make good trades, but
over many iterations, the good traders end up making a greater number of good trades and hence we provide
some distinctions between good and bad trades below (Kashyap 2014b).
1. The factors that dictate a good trade or a bad trade depend on the Time Horizon and the Investment
Objective. The time horizon can be classified into short term, medium term and long term. The
investment objective can be conservative or aggressive. While there are no strict boundaries between
these categories, such a classification helps us with the analysis and better identification of trades.
2. Any trade that fulfills the investment objective and time horizon for which it is made is a good trade.
Otherwise, it is a bad trade.
3. On the face of it, we can view good trades as the profitable ones and bad trades as ones that lose
money. But where possible, if we try and distinguish between proximate causes and ultimate reasons,
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it becomes apparent that good trades can lose money and bad trades can end up making money.
4. Due to the nature of uncertainty in the social sciences: the noise around the expected performance of
any security; our ignorance of the true equilibrium; the behavior of other participants; risk constraints
like liquidity, concentration, unfavorable Geo-political events; etc. implies we would have deviations
from our intended results. The larger the deviation from the intended results, the worse our trade is.
5. What the above implies is that, bad trades show the deficiencies in our planning (estimation process)
and how we have not been able to take into account factors that can lead our results astray. It is true
that due to the extreme complexity of the financial markets, the unexpected ends up happening and
we can never take into account everything. We just need to make sure that the unexpected, even if it
does happen, is contained in the harm it can cause. The good thing about bad trades is the extremely
valuable lessons they hold for us, which takes us through the loop or trials, errors and improvements.
6. We then need to consider, how a good trade can lose money. When we make a trade, if we know
the extent to which we can lose, when this loss can occur and that situation ends up happening, our
planning did reveal the possibility and extent of the loss, hence it is a good trade.
7. The bottom line is that, good trades, or bad trades, are the result of our ability to come up with
possible scenarios and how likely we think they will happen. The ability to visualize possible outcomes
is related to intelligence. Everything else being equal, someone with experience or someone who has had
the benefit of having participated in repetitions of similar situations and then having made decisions in
some cases after mistakes in earlier iterations (learning through trial and error: Ismail 2014; Kashyap
2017; End-note 10) will be better at facing uncertain situations and solving problems.
Zooming back into equities, the following are some other factors that can contribute to good equity trades.
1. The trade will not soak too much of the available liquidity, as measured by the average trading volume,
unless of course, we wish to take a controlling stake in the firm (Bernstein 1987; Pï¿œstor & Stambaugh
2003; Bhide 1993; Amihud 2002; Hameed, Kang & Viswanathan 2010).
2. It is held by a number of investors. There is more uncertainty if there are more investors, but it seems
to work to our benefit in most cases. If the number of investors is limited, the possibility of all of
them doing the opposite of what we want is higher and more likely (Amihud, Mendelson & Uno 1999;
Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny 1992; Chan & Lakonishok 1993; Gompers & Metrick 2001; Asquith,
Pathak & Ritter 2005; An & Zhang 2013).
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3. The noise or the randomness is less so that our decisions can be more accurate. This can be measured
by volatility or the price fluctuations that we see (French, Schwert & Stambaugh 1987; Schwert 1989;
Ang, Hodrick, Xing & Zhang 2006; Glosten, Jagannathan & Runkle 1993).
4. The firm issuing the securities is not too dependent on any particular product, profits from a particular
region, is not overburdened with debt, is paying dividends consistently, its price is not too high compared
to its earnings and other fundamental research indicators (Lancaster 1990; Spence 1976; Bilbiie, Ghironi
& Melitz 2012; Randall & Ulrich 2001; Srinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-Risso & Hanssens 2009).
5. If we are able to see some pattern in the share price changes, that is a good trade. This means that this
security is exhibiting Non-Markovian behavior (Turner, Startz & Nelson 1989; Hassan & Nath 2005;
Cai 1994; Hassan 2009; Litterman 1983). Such behavior is usually hard to detect, but it comes down
to the lens we are using to view the world or the methods we are using to perform historical analysis
(Hamilton 1994; Gujarati 2009; Verbeek 2008).
6. If the security is affected by any asset price bubbles and we are able to detect the formation of such
bubbles (Siegel 2003; Stï¿œckl, Huber & Kirchler 2010; Hott 2009; Andersen & Sornette 2004; Scherbina
& Schlusche 2014; Kashyap 2016a).
7. If we are shorting the security and it has a greater tendency for a downward movement, as exhibited by
its skew and other higher moments (Corrado & Su 1996; Bakshi, Kapadia & Madan 2003; Badrinath
& Chatterjee 1991; Badrinath & Chatterjee 1988; Chen, Hong & Stein 2001; Barberis, Mukherjee &
Wang 2016; Amaya, Christoffersen, Jacobs & Vasquez 2015).
8. So far, we have talked about the unknowns that we know about. What about the unknowns that we
don’t know about. The only thing, we know about these unknown unknowns are that, there must be
a lot of them, hence the need for us to be eternally vigilant (Taleb 2007).
3.1 Models of Planes and Seesaws
The analogy of, building a plane and flying it, to constructing a model and trading with it, will help us
consider the associated risks in a better way. Modeling would be the phase when we are building a plane,
and the outcome of this process is the plane or the model which we have built; trading would then be the
act of flying the plane in the turbulent skies, which are the financial markets. The modelers would then
be the scientists (also engineers) and the pilots would be traders. It is somewhat out of the scope of this
document to discuss questions regarding what kind of person can be good at both modeling and trading.
Trading would need a good understanding of what the model can do and where it will fall short; and building
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a model will need to know the conditions under which an model has to operate and the sudden changes the
trading environment might encounter.
A deterministic world can be made to seem stochastic quite easily, since randomness is only from the point
of the viewer, the creator of uncertainty (also perhaps, the universe) has no randomness. Hence, it might
be possible to start with a few simple rules that makes sense intuitively and explain the stochastic behavior
of most phenomenon. Our investment decisions are made over time and so we set the direction of forward
movement in time to be equivalent to flying the plane forward. Since we cannot see what will happen in the
future; to fly the plane forward, we should not be able to see what is in front of us. This is equivalent to a
plane with the front windows blackened out. All we have are rear view mirrors (most planes don’t exactly
have rear view mirrors, but let us imagine our plane having one) and windows to the side.
As we are cruising along in time, what we have with us is the historical data or the view from behind and
real time data which is the view from the side, to aid in navigating our way forward or to the future. We use
the historical data to build our model and then use the data from the present to help us make forecasts for
what the future holds. The modeling would involve using data inputs to come up with outputs that can help
us decide which securities to pick, or to help set the direction of motion. The trading aspect would involve
using the model outputs and checking if that is the direction in which we want to be heading, that is actually
deciding which securities to pick, and watching out for cases where the predictions are not that reliable.
We can use multi-factor models (Hamilton 1994; Ng, Engle & Rothschild 1992) to decompose overall portfolio
risk and help identify the important sources of risk in the portfolio and link those sources with aspirations
for active return. We need to use the right principles, the right material and the right processes.
1. The right principles would require understanding certain concepts that determine the relevant measure
of risk for any asset and the relationship between expected return and risk when markets are tending
towards equilibrium. Examples for these are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory or other multi index models (Sharpe 1964; Ross 1976; Roll & Ross 1980; Bodie, Kane
& Marcus 2014).
2. The right material translates to having data on the security returns and choosing the relevant factors.
The amount of data and factors that is available is humongous. We need to use some judgment regarding
how much history to use. We also need to be attuned to significance and causality among the factors.
All this can involve some independent data analysis (Krejcie & Morgan 1970; Granger 1981; Adcock
1997; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham 1998; MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang & Hong 1999;
Lenth 2001).
3. The right process would mean using judicious concepts from econometric / statistical theory (Bishop,
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Fienberg & Holland 2007; Eisenbeis 1977). Some examples would be to check for the stationarity of
variables, to normalize the variables to scale them properly, to see if there is any correlation between
the independent variables and correcting for it (Multi-Collinearity: Hamilton 1994; Maddala & Lahiri
1992; End-note 11). We need to make sure no variables that would have an impact are left out (Omitted
Variable Bias: Hamilton 1994; End-note 12).
There needs to be a lot of tinkering; this means we need to have a continuous cycle of coming up with a
prototype, testing how it works and making improvements based on the performance. This is especially
important in the financial markets, since we are chasing moving targets as the markets have a tendency to
be quasi-equilibriums (we never know what a true equilibrium is but perhaps, the markets fluctuate between
multiple equilibriums, somewhat like a see-saw: Mantzicopoulos & Patrick 2010; Stocker 1998; End-note 13).
Modeling needs to be well thought out, with due regard to anticipating as many scenarios as possible and
building in the relevant corrective or abortive mechanisms when adverse situations occur. Given that, we are
never close to accomplishing a perfect model, which can handle all cases without failure and without constant
changes, we would need to constantly supervise the outcomes; hence models that are simple and robust are
better suited, since it is easier to isolate the points of failure when things get rough. Robust here means
producing similar results under a variety of conditions, with some changes to the inputs or the controls.
3.2 Efficient Assumptions, Rational Myths and Catch-22 Conundrums
A primary question that arises in finance is: whether markets are efficient? Questions & Answers (Q&A)
are important. But Definitions & Assumptions (D&A) are perhaps, more important. The good news is that,
Q&A and D&A might be in our very DNA, the biological one (Alberts, Johnson, Lewis, Raff, Roberts &
Walter 2002; End-note 14). Maybe, DNA hold the lessons from the lives of every ancestor we have ever
had. Evolution is constantly coding the information, compressing it and passing forward, what is needed to
survive better and to thrive, building what is essential right into our genes (Church, Gao & Kosuri 2012;
Lutz, Ouchi, Liu & Sawamoto 2013; Kosuri & Church 2014; Roy, Meszynska, Laure, Charles, Verchin & Lutz
2015).
The assumption made in finance regarding homogeneous expectations (Levy & Levy 1996; Chiarella & He
2001), especially in the derivation of the efficient frontier, the CAPM and the Capital Market Line (Bodie,
Kane & Marcus 2014), is stunningly sophisticated, yet seemingly simplistic. Most people would argue that
no two people are alike, so this assumption does not seem validated (Valsiner 2007; Buss 1985; Plomin &
Daniels 1987). Then again, this assumption is perhaps a very futuristic one, where we are picking the best
habits and characteristics, from our fellow beings (maybe not just humans?) and at some point in the future,
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we might tend to have more in common with each other, fulfilling this great assumption, which seems more
of a prophecy. Again, if we become too similar then mother nature, or, evolution, will have less to work with;
since more differences tell her which characteristics are better for certain conditions and many possibilities
create stronger survival potential (Rosenberg 1997; Wilke, ... , & Adami 2001; Elena & Lenski 2003; Nei
2013). Too much similarity might not be an issue if survival is no longer a concern (Kashyap 2018). But
with respect to finance, we might evolve enough, so that one day, we might have the same expectations with
respect to our monetary concerns. This would also be the day when the Bid-Offer spread would cease to
matter, or, we would be indifferent to it, making every coffee shop, theater, street corner, pub, or everywhere
. . . a venue for any product (Kashyap 2015).
Hence if we vary our definitions of efficiency and the corresponding assumptions, a useful chain of thoughts
and efforts would be to capture, whether and how much, the actions of various players takes the markets
towards different forms of efficiency (Fama 1970). This implies a belief that different markets could have
different levels and forms of efficiencies over different times and understanding how the players are acting
could be useful to predict what information could be an advantage, depending on the efficiency that is believed
to be at work.
Perhaps, another way of looking at and understanding this concept is by pondering over the notion of a
rational investor, who has been defined in multiple ways and extensively discussed (also known in economic
circles as Homo Economicus: Persky 1995; Thaler 2000; End-note 15). Before we consider the Q&A / D&A
related to a rational investor, we state a simple game from game theory called “Guess 2/3 of the average”
(Nagel 1995; another related game is known as the Keynesian beauty contest: Keynes 2018; Bï¿œren, Frank
& Nagel 2012; Nagel, Bï¿œhren & Frank 2017; End-note 16). The objective of the game is for the participants
to guess what 2/3 of the average of the guesses of everyone participating in the game will be, and where the
numbers are restricted to the real numbers between 0 and 100, inclusive. The winner is the person whose
chosen number is closest to the 2/3 average of all chosen numbers and will obtain a fixed amount as a payoff
that is independent of the stated number and 2/3. If there is a tie, the prize is divided equally among all the
winners.
There is a unique Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951; Osborne & Rubinstein 1994; End-note 17) for this game
that can be found by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Suppose that all participants guess
the highest possible number, 100, then clearly the average of all the guesses will be 100. But to win, they
need to guess 2/3 of the average, hence their guess has to be 2/3*100, but if everybody has 2/3*100 as their
guess, they need to guess 2/3 of 2/3*100 or 2/3*2/3*100 and this process will continue. Continuing this
line of reasoning k times and as k gets larger and larger, that is as k → ∞, the guess g of any participant
gets closer and closer to zero. Alternately stated, the limiting value for the guess game, g, as the number
of iterations k increases, (as we continue our line of reasoning by taking the 2/3 of the maximum value that
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someone can guess) is given by,
g = lim
k→∞
(
2
3
)k
∗ 100 = 0 (1)
This game is usually played to demonstrate that few people, including students of economics and game
theory, actually get the equilibrium answer of zero (End-note 18). Hence if a rational participant is someone
who would want to win this game by making the right decisions and obtain the winning payoff, it is unclear
whether he should present the above equilibrium guess (Eq 1). This example illustrates that other than
the non-trivial mathematics expected from any rational participant, he is supposed to be anticipating what
everyone will do, which could include the possibility that not everyone participating might be fully rational.
Hence his winning guess might have to be different from the one shown in (Eq 1), making him do irrational
things unless he can not only read the minds of everyone but also force his will upon them to be rational.
To be rational he has make sure everyone acts rationally or he has to act irrationally: a Catch-22 situation
(Heller 1999).
In a similar vein, we can define a rational investor as someone who is not just factoring in the potential
investment decisions of every market participant, but is also having to ensure that everyone is making the
decisions that will be beneficial to him. In the above game, the decisions of everyone had to be the same, but
it could be different in many other situations, especially in the financial markets (we will not discuss further
the very stimulating topic of whether and how two different decisions can still be beneficial and rational to
the participants; but it would perhaps be proper material for a slew of papers and books). The message
for us is that either we all have to become rational investors or nobody can be a rational investor. Another
implication of this chain of thoughts is that if all of us become rational investors then our expectations might
become homogeneous, making markets efficient and validating the assumptions made to derive finance and
economic theories; though if that happens there might be no need for economics and finance at that point,
since we might have transcended beyond the need for wealth, wants and other worldly aspects: another
Catch-22 situation.
The computational challenge in this case was limited due to the rather simplified nature of the exercise.
But in other decision making situations encountered in daily life, the tools and theories of economics pre-
scribe solving complex optimization problems to arrive at the right results. If we ponder on the intellectual
requirements an agent has to possess to confront and navigate his daily challenges, it becomes clear that it
is beyond the capabilities of all humans to use such calculations in their everyday decisions. We want to
highlight here that some humans have created complex but wonderfully elegant solutions for many simple
everyday problems. But even after assuming that such a human would use the solution he has developed for
a particular problem, he would fail to adopt the solutions created by others for other problems he encounters
since he would have limited expertise with problems in another domain.
Clearly, another case is where we might not have developed a solution ourselves, but we have studied
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the solutions of others extensively enough so that we are intimately familiar with it and using it has become
second nature to us. Even if we make the valid argument that many solutions are related and the marginal
effort to master a new solution is less once someone has good knowledge of a few solutions, we need to be
aware that there are too many new techniques and tools being introduced and the complexity in solutions is
increasing significantly. This issue of most of us not being familiar with most solutions is exacerbated with
the highly specialized nature of academic research being conducted and encouraged, coumpounded by the
artificial boundaries we have created by labeling disciplines. Many journals do state that they encourage
multi-disciplinary work but when confronted with work that truly transcends the fake silos of knowledge we
have created, editors and reviewers struggle to make the right decisions: (Ke, Ferrara, Radicchi & Flammini
2015 study how common , “sleeping beauties are in science”, papers whose relevance has not been recognized
for decades, but then suddenly become highly influential and cited; Gans & Shepherd 1994 find that journals
have rejected many papers that later became classics; this should make us aware of the possibility that many
papers are being rejected only because their contributions are not being realized).
We want to emphasize that these are unintended consequences due to the constraints placed on the
actual channeling of research efforts to knowledge creation and dissemination. One reason why such unwanted
outcomes creep up, despite the fact that journals, editors, scholarly associations and other research institutions
are wonderful innovations done with the honorable intention of helping us comprehend the cosmos around
us, is because we live in a world that requires around 2000 IQ points to consistently make correct decisions;
but the smartest of us has only a fraction of that (Ismail 2014; Kashyap 2017; End-note 10). Hence, we need
to rise, above the urge to ridicule, the seemingly obvious blunders of others, since without those marvelous
mistakes, the path ahead will not become clearer for us. Someone with 2000 IQ points is surely a super
hero, aptly named IQ-Man. So a rational investor is this mythical character called IQ-Man, who unlike
other super-humans like Super-Man does not even have a movie about him (for society’s fascination with
superheroes or super-humans see: Reynolds 1992).
4 Sets of Strategies
4.1 Delta-One Strategies
1. Index Re-balance
When an index is re-balanced, certain constituents are removed, added or their weights in the index
are changed. Many participants try to anticipate these changes and take positions depending on what
they expect to change in any index. Trading strategies and market color can be created indicating
expected inflow and outflow at a security level based on the expected weight change or depending
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on the re-balancing event (Kostovetsky 2003; Bloom, Gouws & Holmes 2000; Aked & Moroz 2015;
Chow, Hsu, Kalesnik & Little 2011). Basket Trading Ideas to take advantage of expected inflow and
outflow of Index Funds based on expected weights on the re-balance dates. We can use Index Tracking
(Beasley, Meade & Chang 2003; Guastaroba & Speranza 2012; Dose & Cincotti 2005; Stoyan & Kwon
2010) and Co-Integration (Alexander 1999; Engle & Clive 1987; Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith & Hendry
1993; Harris 1995; Alexander & Dimitriu 2005a, b) principles to provide better estimates of the baskets
and capture a certain level of dollar flows. MSCI (Hau, Massa & Peress 2009; Chakrabarti, Huang,
Jayaraman & Lee 2005; End-note 19) indices are ideal set to start with and it is possible to extend it
to other indices with minor adjustments depending on the rules used for the re-balancing that could
differ among the many index providers. This strategy would need index membership information from
the relevant index providers. Please see Index Tracking and Co-Integration in points 4, 5
2. Macro Theme Baskets
Creation of stock baskets depending on Macro themes (Burstein 1999; Franci, Marschinski & Matassini
2001; Chen, Leung & Daouk 2003). Bounce Basket: Securities expected to benefit the most from
the rebound in the securities markets and the overall economy (section 5). Short Basket: Securities
that are expected to show a significant fall due to fundamental weakness and an overall drop in the
market. Securities that perform the best during upward expected Inflationary moves. Securities that
perform the best during upward movement of Oil Prices, Gold Prices or other commodities. Regional
baskets that can best cater to investors looking for regional exposure. These baskets are identified by
performing a factor analysis (principal component analysis or regressions can also be used: Hamilton
1994; End-note 20) of historical security prices and other factor indicators (Ludvigson & Ng 2007;
Jolliffe 1986; Shlens 2005; Costello & Osborne 2005). We can use Index Tracking and Co-Integration
principles to provide better estimates of the baskets. Please see Index Tracking and Co-Integration in
points 1, 4, 5. Macroeconomic data-sources would be required for this set of trading ideas.
3. Sector Theme Baskets
These set of strategies are aimed at capitalizing on expected sector rotations. Depending on various
macroeconomic developments and business cycle trends, different sectors are expected to be either
bullish or bearish. We can create baskets of stocks to benefit most from these expected trends. It
is possible to put a regional spin on each of the baskets below. We can customize this for different
durations of the trades and different notional amounts. We can use Index Tracking and Co-Integration
principles to provide better estimates of the baskets. Please see Index Tracking and Co-Integration in
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points 1, 4, 5. Sector specific data-sources would be required for this set of trading ideas.
The following are some of the sector theme baskets.
• Gaming (Casino) Basket
• Real Estate Basket
• Technology Basket
• Financials Basket
• Utilities Basket
• Travel and Luxury Hotels Basket
4. Index Tracking Baskets
We can customize this based on two characteristics. Create baskets of stocks to track the index with
the least tracking error and a desired number of stocks. Produce a certain amount of tracking error and
select the number of stocks required to achieve this level of tracking error. Please see Index Tracking
and Co-Integration references in point 1.
5. Co-Integration Baskets
Pairs Trading Ideas are based on two portfolios (or even individual securities: Miao 2014) of stocks
which have moved together historically, but are now in diverging positions, so we expect them to
converge back. This is easily implemented for pairs of securities in the same sector. Please see Index
Tracking and Co-Integration references in point 1.
6. Portfolio Risk Basket
Many sell side desks take on principal positions (commit their own capital instead of acting just as an
intermediary) on baskets of stocks that are opposite to client trades. A basis point quote is provided
to the client based on the market impact to enter the positions, to exit the positions, volatility of the
security prices, expected duration to enter the position, expected duration to exit the position and
transaction costs. Inventory Management techniques (Lancioni & Howard 1978; Blackstone Jr & Cox
1985) will need to be used to manage the overall exposures on the desk that is creating this strategy
and this will be incorporated into the basis point pricing of the risk basket.
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7. Index Arbitrage Trading Ideas
Arbitrage between the prices of index constituents and the corresponding futures contracts (Chung
1991; Dwyer Jr, Locke & Yu 1996; Kumar & Seppi 1994; Nandan, Agrawal & Jindal 2015; Fung, Lau
& Tse 2015). We will need to consider the effect of stock commissions and futures commissions on
the profitability of the trades. We can provide early close out options as opposed to close out on the
expiration date. We will need to consider the market impact of the stock transactions on the stock
price when we put on the trade and the effect of the same if we do an early close out.
8. Rich / Cheap Analysis based on Stock Beta
We can create baskets of under-priced and overpriced securities based on the Beta of individual securities
versus different indices acting as a proxy for the market (Black 1992; Isakov 1999; Amihud & Mendelson
1989; Fletcher 2000).
9. Equity Swap Baskets
In certain markets, most investors do not have access to trade the securities and the only way to get
access to these markets is through swaps from a registered broker (Kijima & Muromachi 2001; Gay,
Venkateswaran, Kolb & Overdahl 2008; Chance & Rich 1998; Wang & Liao 2003; Wu & Chen 2007;
End-note 21). We can create swap baskets to pick up exposure for the above themes; also swap baskets
can be created for the other markets as well, since it could be a good alternative to trading all the other
investments.
10. Risk and Best Execution Metrics
We can create risk metrics to supplement the information on trade execution in terms of market impact,
market risk and optimal timing of transactions (Smithson 1998; Bouchaud & Potters 2003; Wipplinger
2007; Christoffersen 2012). It would be helpful to collect information on the market impact of individual
transactions or portfolios based on the timing requirements of implementing the strategies. This market
impact can be calibrated to the orders, executions and the skill of the executions teams within the firm
so that it will capitalize on the trading advantages possessed by the firm. Such information can not
only help with the planning of optimal execution strategies to reduce the market impact and market
risk of the resulting portfolio, but can be useful to check if the trading strategy is viable; since even
though it promises to produce good returns but implementing it might eat away the returns. Optimal
execution will be in terms of the number of pieces the overall basket will be broken into and the duration
14
and timing over which to trade the individual pieces. Portfolio risk monitoring will be needed for the
individual strategies and changes in risk levels will need to be monitored for different increments /
decrements to the various trading strategies.
4.2 Derivative Strategies
To implement these, we would need some derivatives pricing and risk modules, a basic level of which can
be implemented in MATLAB. Since the number of combinations of derivative instruments is huge, only a
brief overview is provided below. Depending on the specifics of the instruments and the market conditions,
various strategies can be implemented.
1. We can have trades on index options and options on the constituents based on the volatility of the
individual securities and the volatility level of the index and the correlation between individual security
pairs and the average level of correlation in the basket. These are known as volatility and dispersion
Trades (Marshall 2009; Meissner 2016; Driessen, Maenhout & Vilkov 2009);
2. We predict volatility levels using ARCH / GARCH models and trade instruments that are theoretically
mispriced when compared to the implied volatility levels (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold & Labys 2003;
Andersen & Bollerslev 1998; Engle & Ng 1993; Xu & Malkiel 2003; Bollerslev, Chou & Kroner 1992;
Nelson 1991).
3. Put – Call Parity violations (Cremers & Weinbaumv 2010; Klemkosky & Resnick 1979; Finucane 1991),
combined with either implied volatilities or based on predicted ARCH / GARCH volatility levels, can
be used to find undervalued or overvalued instruments and appropriate strategies can be constructed.
4. Option hedges are possible for basket trades constructed in the delta one section 4.1.
5. Structures based on different options, that is structured equity derivatives (Kat 2001) suitable for
different Macro, Sector themes and Expectations.
5 Beating Benchmarks by Building Bouncy Baskets
The “Bounce Basket” is designed for someone to express a bullish view on the market by allowing them
to take long positions on securities that would benefit the most from a rally in the markets. The central
idea of this theme is to identity securities from a regional perspective that are heavily shorted and yet are
fundamentally sound (Summers 1986; Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek & Sloan 2001; Bakshi & Chen 2005) with
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at least a minimum buy rating from a consensus of stock analysts covering the securities (Barber, Lehavy,
McNichols & Trueman 2001; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols & Trueman 2003; Brown, Wei & Wermers 2013).
The most heavily shorted securities are obtained from a top shorts ranking model (Kashyap 2017b). To
outline the intuition behind such a ranking, suppose we wanted to rank the most livable city in the world (or
let us say, the best soccer player in history). We would identify characteristics that might be useful to make
such an assessment. We would weight the individual characteristics and then collect data for the entities that
are being ranked. We could then calculate an overall score, (an aggregation based on the collected data and
corresponding weights), which would then yield a suitable ranking; since, having one number for each object
we are interested in, facilitates a ranking.
Once a ranking is formed, we could use some of the factors as the criteria for exclusion from the finalized
standings. These factors act as filters to remove securities from the overall universe of stocks in a region (say
Asia) based on specific levels of the parameters. Again, to outline the intuition here: a city could rank very
well on most factors, but could be below acceptable standards in one factor, (say air quality), requiring that
it be removed from the final ranking; and hence certain securities would be excluded from the final basket.
Below we discuss some of the factors that can be helpful towards forming such a ranking from a securities
lending perspective, the rationale behind their usage to create the ranking and also provide contextual and
numerical pointers that could be used to implement the filtering mechanism.
1. Short Interest (SI) - The short interest is the amount of shares shorted in a security by all market
participants (best be expressed in USD so it is normalized across securities and also when dealing with
multi-market regions like Asia), and is clearly a direct indicator of investors wishing to express negative
sentiment on that stock. Only securities with Short Interest of more than a certain USD value (say 10
million) are considered for inclusion into the basket. An adjustment is made to factor in the relative
size of the markets. This would mean that for two securities with say short interest of 11 million USD,
one from Japan and one from Taiwan, the Taiwan security would get ranked higher since the stock loan
market for Japan is higher and the levels of short interest are much higher for Japanese stocks (Asquith,
Pathak & Ritter 2005; Kashyap 2016c; Bris, Goetzmann & Zhu 2007; SI can also be expressed as a
ratio: End-note 22; but using the actual share amount makes for a more granular ranking and generally
traders want to know how many shares are shorted compared not just to the float amount, but the
supply they can obtain from other lenders. Also the loan rates are higher when the short interest
compared to the float is higher, so another factor captures the effect of this ratio. The SI ratio is also
included as a separate factor referred to below as the Days to Cover).
2. Loan Rates (LR) - The most important variable that indicates how heavily shorted a security is, is the
loan rate. Only securities with annual loan rates greater than a threshold (say, 1.5%) are considered.
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An adjustment is done to factor in the maximum level of loan rates in each market similar to point 1
above. A lending desk has at-least two flavors of these loan rates (a rate at which the desk is able to
source inventory and another rate which is slightly higher since it is the rate at which loans are made
to end investors).
3. Days To Cover (DTC) - Days to cover (also known as the Short Interest Ratio; (Hong, Li, Ni,
Scheinkman & Yan 2015; End-note 22) is a measurement of a company’s issued shares that are cur-
rently shorted, expressed as the number of days required to close out all of the short positions. It is
calculated by taking the number of shares that are currently shorted and dividing that amount by the
average daily volume for the shares in question. For example, if a company has average daily volume
of 1 million shares and 2 million shares are currently short sold, the shares have a cover rate of 2 days
(2M/1M). A higher value for this metric indicates that if investors wish to cover their shorts, it could
take many days and during that time, their positions could end up losing money significantly. Only
securities requiring more than a certain days to cover, (say, 4) are considered.
4. Loan Balance Growth (LBG) - The loan balance is a notional amount (measured in USD) and represents
the total amount of loans being made by a particular broker or short selling desk. Hence, growth in
this amount (expressed in percentage terms), captures the increase in the short sentiment being seen
by this participant. This information is sometimes shared with clients who are interested in trading
with the desk. Only securities with loan balance growth of more than a certain percentage, (say 25%)
over the past few months are considered.
5. Inverse Loan Availability (ILA or Loan Availability, LA) - The availability is the amount of shares that
could be possibly borrowed towards putting on additional short positions. It is the amount available
for shorting but currently unused. The inverse of this number (normalized by expressing in USD) is
used as contribution factor towards a total score, since lower this amount, greater the pressure on loan
rates and a higher indication that a particular security is heavily shorted. Only securities with loan
availability below a certain threshold are considered (say 10 million USD) are considered.
6. Liquidity (L) - We consider the average daily trading volume to ensure that once a basket is constructed,
we have enough volume being traded so that we can implement this strategy without liquidity problems.
Only securities that had a 20 day average trading volume (ADV) of more than a certain figure (say, 25
million USD) are considered.
7. Buy Rating (BR) - Only securities with a minimum buy rating from a consensus of analysts covering
the stocks are considered. The rationale behind this is that, as markets rebound, the securities that
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are fundamentally sounds are the ones that will receive positive inflows and trend up higher. Securities
that have problems with their operations are likely to remain in the negative investor sentiment zone,
or stay shorted.
8. High Beta (HB) - The securities with a relatively high beta in comparison to the market are chosen
so that they are geared to capitalize the most from any upward movement in the overall market. Only
Securities with Beta more than a certain value (say, 1.2) are considered.
The factors related to securities lending(SI, LR,DTC,LBG, ILA) and the liquidity(L) are technical in nature
(they have a time series that changes quite often) and hence they are further checked for stability and changes
over time by looking at the moving average and volatility of the particular factor over the last few (two or
three) months. Securities with a higher moving average are ranked higher and securities with higher volatility
are ranked lower. Additional factors such as the total number of lenders, the number of total shares available
for securities loans, etc. can be included. The weights are estimated using a trial and error (Ismail 2014;
Kashyap 2017c; End-note 10) approach so that the profitability of the securities chosen from a securities
lending perspective over a historical period are maximized. The rationale for such a weighting scheme is
that, a security is the most shorted security, if it was creating significant profits for the trading desk. One
sample model for the overall scoring mechanism can be summarized as below in (Eq: 2):
Total Score =
n∑
i=1
wifi = wsiSI + wlrLR+ wdtcDTC + wlbgLBG+ wilaILA (2)
+ Factors to capture moving average and volatility of individual variables (3)
Here, n is the total number of factors, fi (4)
wi are the weights of the individual factors (5)
Also,
n∑
i=1
wi = 1 (6)
5.1 Sharpening the Sharpe Ratio
A key issue with the above scoring mechanism is the subjectivity of the weights and the necessity of having
to constantly tweak them. A significant amount of effort is involved to ensure that the weights are closely
aligned with the drivers of the P&L. As an alternate to the above scoring mechanism (that is a separate
aggregation of a number of factors weighted subjectively), we could use a single numeric indicator similar
to the Sharpe ratio, SR (Sharpe 1966; 1994; End-note 23). The SR combines the risk, (σr, the standard
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deviation of returns), and return, (E (r), the expected return or an estimate based on historical returns), of
each individual asset or portfolio to give one number that contributes to a ranking. The return figure used
is the return of the asset in excess of a certain threshold, which is usually the risk free rate, rf , but it could
be the return on any other benchmark security (SR = E(r)−rfσr ). This ensures that assets providing returns
below the threshold have a negative score and are relegated towards the bottom of the ranking. A similar
score can be created based on the loan rates and the corresponding standard deviation as shown in (Eq: 7),
Short Score One =
E (LR)− rf
σLR
(7)
If the loan rates are below the risk free rate (or another higher threshold), any loans made on those securities
are not contributing much to bottom-line (to obtain those shares we would need to borrow money at the
risk free rate but we only earn back less than that), though many lending desks need to make loans in these
positions (or bundle it up with other securities as collateral for other positions; Sakurai & Uchida 2014;
Duffie, Scheicher & Vuillemey 2015; Fuhrer, Guggenheim & Schumacher 2016; End-note 24) since other
trading desks within the firm could be long those stocks. Given their low contribution to the P&L, these
securities are not to be placed in the top short ranking, irrespective of the values of other factors. Figure 1
can help us to understand why we need the minimum loan rate threshold and why just the ratio of return
to risk is not enough. Security BBB with an expected loan rate, E (LR) = 5.00, and a loan rate standard
deviation, σLR= 2.00, ranks higher than security CCC with E (LR) = 8.00 and σLR= 4.00 when we consider
just the ratio of expected loan rate and loan rate standard deviation, E (LR) /σLR. This issue is fixed and
security CCC is ranked higher than BBB when we consider the excess loan rate or loan rate premium divided
by the loan rate standard deviation, [E (LR)− rf ] /σLR to obtain a score.
Figure 1: Ranking with and without Rate Threshold
We could extend the above short score (Eq: 7) to include the short interest, loan availability, days to
cover and the loan balance growth to get the formulations shown in (Eqs: 8, 9, 10).
Short Score Two =
{
ξ (SI)
ξ (LA)
}{
E (LR)− rf
σLR
}
(8)
Short Score Three =
{
SI
ADV
}{
ξ (SI)
ξ (LA)
}{
E (LR)− rf
σLR
}
≡ {DTC}
{
ξ (SI)
ξ (LA)
}{
E (LR)− rf
σLR
}
(9)
Short Score Four =
(
LBt
LBt−N
)
(DTC)
{
ξ (SI)
ξ (LA)
}{
E (LR)− rf
σLR
}
(10)
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Due to the multiplication of factors, the loan balance growth is better represented as the ratio of the loan
balance (instead of in percentage terms, which is suitable for a summation) at the end and start of the
time period under consideration (a higher ratio, indicating an increase in the loan balance contribution to a
higher score and vice versa, LBG = LBt/LBt−N ). Here, LBt is the loan balance at time t;ξ () represents
the moving average function applied over the last few (two or three) months. Without taking the moving
average, the ranking would be sensitive to daily changes and might change quite drastically from day to day.
Scores based on the moving average are more stable, hence depending on the trading strategy (whether we
are re-balancing the portfolio on a weekly basis or once in a few months), we can choose, either the moving
average or the values on a particular day.
Other extensions could use a SR type score for each variable and combine it with the other variables.
Instead of the risk free rate, we would need to use a suitable cutoff point for the other variables, such that
when the variable drops below that point, it gets taken out of the top ranking (by having a negative score).
We need to pay attention while combining such ratios since if more than two variables have a negative value
and they are multiplied together, the resultant score could still be positive.
5.2 Data Generation via Simulation
The bounce basket (and other such baskets) can be created by various sell side brokers for buy side firms.
Having an idea of how such baskets are created (including the factors used based on the discussion above)
can lead to meaningful discussions between the two parties that want to participate in such a scheme and be
immensely useful towards maximizing the benefits of such a strategy. The data-set required for an in-house
flavor of the above idea, for risk monitoring or fine tuning the parameters, can be obtained by any investment
firm from the securities lending desks of their prime brokers (Hildebrand 2007; Melvin & Taylor 2009; Jacobs
& Levy 1993; End-note 25).
As noted earlier, given the number of random variables involved (and hence the complexity of the system),
a certain amount of computational infrastructure would be necessary. A typical securities lending desk can
have loan positions on anywhere from a few hundred to upwards of a few thousand different securities and
many years of historical data. It is therefore, a good complement to build some intelligence (software routines
that automatically run daily using data received from broker firms) that utilizes the historical time series
and calculates the short score from the corresponding formulae derived in section 5.1 without the need for
too many ongoing changes.
To demonstrate how this technique would work, we simulate the historical time series. Also, a typical
investment firm (as opposed to the intermediary, who would have all the above information) is unlikely to have
access to the full historical time series (but might have the time series of loan rates, prices, trading volume and
availability) and hence could simulate the variables for which the historical data is absent, as shown in this
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section, to come up with a short score. We create one hundred different hypothetical securities and we come
up with the time series of all the variables involved (Price, Availability, Short Interest, Trading Volume, Loan
Rate, Alternate Loan Rate) by modelling them as Geometric Brownian motions with uncertainty introduced
via sampling from suitable log normal distributions ((Eqs: 11, 12; see, Norstad 1999 for normal, log normal
distributions; Hull & Basu 2016 provide an excellent account of using geometric Brownian motions to model
stock prices and other time series that are always positive). It is worth noting, that the mean and standard
deviation of the time series are themselves simulations from other appropriately chosen uniform distributions
(Figure 2). Some of the above variables can be modeled as Poisson distributions or simply consider them as
the absolute value of a normal distribution with appropriately chosen units. As an example, we model the
Loan Balance process as a folded normal distribution or by taking the absolute value of a normal distribution.
The mean and standard deviation of the loan balance distribution for each security are chosen from another
appropriately chosen uniform distribution.
Geometric Brownian Motion ≡ dSit
Sit
= µSidt+ σSidW
Si
t (11)
WSit ⇐⇒Weiner Process governing Sthi variable. (12)
Alternately, Sit ∼
∣∣N (µSi , σ2Si)∣∣ , Absolute Normal Distribution (13)
The simulation seed is chosen so that the drift and volatility we get for the variables are similar to what
would be observed in practice. For example in Figure 2, the price and rate volatility are lower than the
volatilities of the availability and other quantities, which tend to be much higher; the range of the drift
for the quantities (share amounts) is also higher as compared to the drift range of prices and rates. This
ensures that we are keeping it as close to a realistic setting as possible, without having access to an actual
historical time series. The volatility and drift (mean and standard deviation for the loan balance process) of
the variables for each security are shown in Figure 3. The length of the simulated time series is a little longer
than one year or 252 trading days for each security. A sample of the time series of the variables generated
using the simulated drift and volatility parameters is shown in Figure 4. The full time series shown below is
available upon request.
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Figure 2: Simulation Seed
Figure 3: Simulation Sample Distributions
Figure 4: Simulation Sample Time Series
5.3 Simple Sample Ranking
We provide three flavors of the short scores of the securities based on the 60 day moving average of the
variables, the values on the first day and the values on the last day of the sample in (Figures 5, 6, 7) corre-
spondingly. Under each of the three flavors, we consider all four formulations of the short scores mentioned
in section 5.1. Comparing the scores on the first day and last day should give us an idea of how the scores
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(and hence the ranking) can change over the duration of a few months. Also, availability can be zero for
certain securities, leading to a error in the score calculation (divide by zero error), which is avoided in many
cases by using a moving average. Since our scores are based on a simulation we see some low loan rates,
low availability and high short interest numbers. In general, low availability and high short interest will be
reflected in higher loan rates. Similarly high loan rates, high availability and low short interest rarely occur
in practice. The days to cover generally does not include the moving average of the short interest, but we
use the moving average only for the flavor in Figure 5.
Securities with negative events in terms of credit rating downgrades, earnings downgrades, ongoing litigation
or the commencement of new litigation, failure to close a major deal, loss of a significant customer etc., are
removed on a case by case basis. The source for this information can be market data vendors or credit rating
companies. This step is included as a fail-safe procedure since the analyst rating filters and short factors we
have in place would remove most of these securities. The securities in the basket are weighted based on a
combination of their top shorts ranking and market capitalization with a maximum weight of 10% for any
single security. Baskets are constructed using the same concept for different historical periods when there is
an upward rally and the bounce basket is found to outperform the broader market at a statistically significant
level (the level can vary).
The initial ranking of top shorts is ideally done over a large universe and the final basket will need around a
couple of dozen stocks and hence filters need to be chosen to narrow down the original list. We can remove a
certain percentage of securities from the bottom (say 20%) from this ranked set of securities and additional
filters can be applied (sector, market capitalization, etc.) to further narrow down the constituents of the
basket. Some details about how filters can be applied are provided in the explanation of the factors and
the selection methodology above. Some of the markets on which empirical tests were tried include Japan,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Custom baskets for each market
or even for individual sectors can be created based on the same selection model.
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Figure 5: Short Scores - 60 Day Moving Average
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Figure 6: Short Scores - First Day of Sample
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Figure 7: Short Scores - Last Day of Sample
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6 Taming the Volatility Skew
One of the main drawbacks of volatility is that it fails to capture the effect of changes in the direction in
the time series of any variable. This is because both rising or falling prices still have volatility and if we are
long a security, upwardly mobile prices could get penalized in any portfolio management decisions. (Figures
8, 9, 10) illustrate this limitation of using volatility. In all three figures, we compare two variables with
different time paths, but which offer the same net return over the time period under consideration. In Figure
8, variable one and variable two both have a steady upward path (not a single down movement), but variable
two which has a higher volatility ends up having a lower return to volatility ratio (return to risk ratio, if
volatility is used to measure risk) and could get underrepresented in a portfolio in comparison with variable
one; clearly a sub-optimal outcome. Likewise, in Figure 9, variable two has lower volatility but has falling
prices for sometime, when compared to variable one, which does not have a single fall in price. Lastly, in
Figure 10, variable one is falling more steadily than variable two, but variable one has greater volatility and
hence can be seen as better than variable two from a return to volatility perspective. These examples show
that volatility is not the most conducive metric to represent risk.
A key improvement in all the strategies discussed would be some method to factor in the effect of changes in
the upward or downward movements of a variable over time, since such directional changes could be either
beneficial or detrimental to our trading position, depending on whether we are long or short. This would be
especially important for the purpose of creating any ranking, which is central to the bounce basket, since we
would need to know how steady the changes in a variable are, in terms of whether it is trending upwards or
downwards. For this, a specially developed factor called the time weighted arrival deviation (Kashyap 2017a)
can be used as a metric to measure the path taken by the variable to arrive at the current value over the last
few months. To articulate the intuition, any security that had steady upward growth is ranked higher than
a security with similar growth but more ups and downs (or change in direction) in the path. Similarly, any
security that had steady downward growth is ranked lower than a security with similar downward growth
but with more changes in direction in the path. In short, securities are penalized for having ups and downs
in their price process, but unidirectional jumps in the direction of intended movement (if our position is long
then we want the price to go up) suffer no such penalty.
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Figure 8: Limitations of Volatility
Figure 9: Limitations of Volatility
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Figure 10: Limitations of Volatility
7 A Happy Ending
We have looked at a number of delta-one and derivative trading strategies, related market color and pointers
to practically implement these investment ideas. We have discussed in detail a trading strategy, called the
bounce basket, for someone to express a bullish view on the market by allowing them to take long positions
on securities that would benefit the most from a rally in the markets. The advantages of investing in a
moderate amount of computing infrastructure and hiring personnel with technical abilities were illustrated in
terms of having a wider choice of investment alternatives, increased returns and better management of risky
outcomes. Given the dynamic nature of the financial markets, it would be practical to have a feedback loop
that changes the parameters of the strategy depending on changes in market conditions (Kashyap 2014a).
8 End-notes
1. Trading Strategy, Wikipedia Link In finance, a trading strategy is a fixed plan that is designed to
achieve a profitable return by going long or short in markets. The main reasons that a properly
researched trading strategy helps are its verifiability, quantifiability, consistency, and objectivity. For
every trading strategy one needs to define assets to trade, entry/exit points and money management
rules. Bad money management can make a potentially profitable strategy unprofitable.
2. Market Color is a word commonly used on trading desks both on the buy side and sell side (End-notes
3, 4). It refers to information regarding the financial markets, many times changes in variables that are
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deemed relevant to make trading decisions. The sell side provides many such pieces of information to
the buy side, eventually hoping to get trades done on the back of this such material. This could also
be considered as research done by analysts on both the sell side and the buy side.
3. Sell Side, Wikipedia Link Sell side is a term used in the financial services industry. The three main
markets for this selling are the stock, bond, and foreign exchange market. It is a general term that
indicates a firm that sells investment services to asset management firms, typically referred to as the
buy side, or corporate entities. One important note, the sell side and the buy side work hand in hand
and each side could not exist without the other. These services encompass a broad range of activities,
including broking/dealing, investment banking, advisory functions, and investment research.
4. Buy Side, Wikipedia Link Buy-side is a term used in investment firms to refer to advising institutions
concerned with buying investment services. Private equity funds, mutual funds, life insurance compa-
nies, unit trusts, hedge funds, and pension funds are the most common types of buy side entities. In
sales and trading, the split between the buy side and sell side should be viewed from the perspective of
securities exchange services. The investing community must use those services to trade securities. The
"Buy Side" are the buyers of those services; the "Sell Side", also called "prime brokers", are the sellers
of those services.
5. Delta One, Wikipedia Link Delta One products are financial derivatives that have no optionality and
as such have a delta of (or very close to) one – meaning that for a given instantaneous move in the
price of the underlying asset there is expected to be an identical move in the price of the derivative.
Delta one products can sometimes be synthetically assembled by combining options.
6. Derivative (finance), Wikipedia Link In finance, a derivative is a contract that derives its value from
the performance of an underlying entity. This underlying entity can be an asset, index, or interest rate,
and is often simply called the "underlying." Derivatives can be used for a number of purposes, including
insuring against price movements (hedging), increasing exposure to price movements for speculation or
getting access to otherwise hard-to-trade assets or markets.
7. Bloomberg, Wikipedia Link Bloomberg L.P. is a privately held financial, software, data, and media
company headquartered in Midtown Manhattan, New York City. It was founded by Michael Bloomberg
in 1981, with the help of Thomas Secunda, Duncan MacMillan, Charles Zegar, and a 30% ownership
investment by Merrill Lynch.
8. Matlab, Wikipedia Link MATLAB (matrix laboratory) is a multi-paradigm numerical computing en-
vironment and proprietary programming language developed by MathWorks. MATLAB allows matrix
manipulations, plotting of functions and data, implementation of algorithms, creation of user interfaces,
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and interfacing with programs written in other languages, including C, C++, C#, Java, Fortran and
Python.
9. Statistical Software, Wikipedia Link Statistical software are specialized computer programs for analysis
in statistics and econometrics.
10. Nassim Taleb and Daniel Kahneman discuss Trial and Error / IQ Points, among other things, at the
New York Public Library on Feb 5, 2013. As Taleb explains, “it is trial with small errors that are
important for progress”. The emphasis on small errors is especially true in a portfolio management
context, since a huge error could lead to a blow up of the investment fund. (Ismail 2014) mentions the
following quote from Taleb, “Knowledge gives you a little bit of an edge, but tinkering (trial and error)
is the equivalent of 1,000 IQ points. It is tinkering that allowed the industrial revolution”.
11. Multicollinearity, Wikipedia Link In statistics, multicollinearity (also collinearity) is a phenomenon in
which one predictor variable in a multiple regression model can be linearly predicted from the others
with a substantial degree of accuracy. In this situation the coefficient estimates of the multiple regression
may change erratically in response to small changes in the model or the data. Multicollinearity does
not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole, at least within the sample data
set; it only affects calculations regarding individual predictors. That is, a multivariate regression model
with collinear predictors can indicate how well the entire bundle of predictors predicts the outcome
variable, but it may not give valid results about any individual predictor, or about which predictors
are redundant with respect to others.
12. Omitted-variable bias, Wikipedia Link In statistics, omitted-variable bias (OVB) occurs when a sta-
tistical model leaves out one or more relevant variables. The bias results in the model attributing the
effect of the missing variables to the estimated effects of the included variables. More specifically, OVB
is the bias that appears in the estimates of parameters in a regression analysis, when the assumed spec-
ification is incorrect in that it omits an independent variable that is correlated with both the dependent
variable and one or more of the included independent variables.
13. Seesaw, Wikipedia Link A seesaw (also known as a teeter-totter or teeterboard) is a long, narrow board
supported by a single pivot point, most commonly located at the midpoint between both ends; as one
end goes up, the other goes down.
14. DNA, Wikipedia Link Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule composed of two chains that coil
around each other to form a double helix carrying the genetic instructions used in the growth, de-
velopment, functioning, and reproduction of all known living organisms and many viruses. DNA and
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ribonucleic acid (RNA) are nucleic acids; alongside proteins, lipids and complex carbohydrates (polysac-
charides), nucleic acids are one of the four major types of macromolecules that are essential for all known
forms of life.
15. Homo Economicus, Wikipedia Link The term homo economicus, or economic man, is a caricature of
economic theory framed as a "mythical species" or word play on homo sapiens, and used in pedagogy.
It stands for a portrayal of humans as agents who are consistently rational and narrowly self-interested,
and who usually pursue their subjectively-defined ends optimally.
16. Keynesian Beauty Contest, Wikipedia Link. Keynes described the action of rational agents in a market
using an analogy based on a fictional newspaper contest, in which entrants are asked to choose the six
most attractive faces from a hundred photographs. Those who picked the most popular faces are then
eligible for a prize. A naive strategy would be to choose the face that, in the opinion of the entrant, is
the most handsome. A more sophisticated contest entrant, wishing to maximize the chances of winning
a prize, would think about what the majority perception of attractive is, and then make a selection
based on some inference from his knowledge of public perceptions. This can be carried one step further
to take into account the fact that other entrants would each have their own opinion of what public
perceptions are. Thus the strategy can be extended to the next order and the next and so on, at each
level attempting to predict the eventual outcome of the process based on the reasoning of other rational
agents. Keynes believed that similar behavior was at work within the stock market. This would have
people pricing shares not based on what they think their fundamental value is, but rather on what they
think everyone else thinks their value is, or what everybody else would predict the average assessment
of value to be.
17. Nash Equilibrium, Wikipedia LinkIn game theory, the Nash equilibrium, named after American math-
ematician John Forbes Nash Jr., is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or more
players in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no
player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy.
18. Experimental Results of Guess 2/3 of the average, Wikipedia LinkWe have tried more than ten trials
of this game as a classroom experiment with students of economics and finance. The number of
participants varied from 25 to around 60. When the number of participants were large, the students
were asked to provide their answers in teams of three or four so that the total number of answers were
usually between 15 to 20. This was done only to reduce the overhead later in finalizing the results. The
students played the game to obtain a certain advantage in their final score for the course. The winning
guess has usually been between 20 to 30. An interesting note is that when the team size is more than
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one, it leads to a lower guess.
19. MSCI, Wikipedia Link MSCI Inc. (formerly Morgan Stanley Capital International and MSCI Barra),
is a Global provider of equity, fixed income, hedge fund stock market indexes, and multi-asset portfolio
analysis tools. It publishes the MSCI BRIC, MSCI World and MSCI EAFE Indexes. The company is
currently headquartered at 7 World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York City, U.S.
20. Factor Analysis, Wikipedia Link Factor analysis is a statistical method used to describe variability
among observed, correlated variables in terms of a potentially lower number of unobserved variables
called factors. For example, it is possible that variations in six observed variables mainly reflect the
variations in two unobserved (underlying) variables. Factor analysis searches for such joint variations
in response to unobserved latent variables. The observed variables are modelled as linear combinations
of the potential factors, plus "error" terms. Factor analysis aims to find independent latent variables.
The theory behind factor analytic methods is that the information gained about the interdependencies
between observed variables can be used later to reduce the set of variables in a dataset.
21. Equity Swap, Wikipedia Link An equity swap is a financial derivative contract (a swap) where a set
of future cash flows are agreed to be exchanged between two counterparties at set dates in the future.
The two cash flows are usually referred to as "legs" of the swap; one of these "legs" is usually pegged
to a floating rate such as LIBOR. This leg is also commonly referred to as the "floating leg". The other
leg of the swap is based on the performance of either a share of stock or a stock market index. This
leg is commonly referred to as the "equity leg". Most equity swaps involve a floating leg vs. an equity
leg, although some exist with two equity legs. An equity swap involves a notional principal, a specified
duration and predetermined payment intervals. The term "tenor" may refer either to the duration or
the coupon frequency. Equity swaps are typically traded by Delta One trading desks.
22. Short Interest Ratio, Wikipedia Link The short interest ratio (also called days-to-cover ratio) represents
the number of days it takes short sellers on average to cover their positions, that is repurchase all of
the borrowed shares. It is calculated by dividing the number of shares sold short by the average daily
trading volume, generally over the last 30 trading days. The ratio is used by both fundamental and
technical traders to identify trends. The days-to-cover ratio can also be calculated for an entire exchange
to determine the sentiment of the market as a whole. If an exchange has a high days-to-cover ratio of
around five or greater, this can be taken as a bearish signal, and vice versa.
23. Sharpe Ratio, Wikipedia Link In finance, the Sharpe ratio (also known as the Sharpe index, the Sharpe
measure, and the reward-to-variability ratio) is a way to examine the performance of an investment by
adjusting for its risk. The ratio measures the excess return (or risk premium) per unit of deviation in
an investment asset or a trading strategy, typically referred to as risk, named after William F. Sharpe.
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24. Marketable Collateral, Wikipedia Link Marketable collateral is the exchange of financial assets, such
as stocks and bonds, for a loan between a financial institution and borrower. To be deemed marketable
collateral, assets must be capable of being sold under normal market conditions with reasonable prompt-
ness at a fair market value. Conditions are based upon actual transactions on an auction or similarly
available daily bid, or ask price market.
25. Prime Broker, Wikipedia Link Prime brokerage is the generic name for a bundled package of services
offered by investment banks, wealth management firms, and securities dealers to hedge funds which
need the ability to borrow securities and cash in order to be able to invest on a netted basis and
achieve an absolute return. The prime broker provides a centralized securities clearing facility for the
hedge fund so the hedge fund’s collateral requirements are netted across all deals handled by the prime
broker. These two features are advantageous to their clients. The prime broker benefits by earning
fees ("spreads") on financing the client’s margined long and short cash and security positions, and by
charging, in some cases, fees for clearing and other services. It also earns money by rehypothecating
the margined portfolios of the hedge funds currently serviced and charging interest on those borrowing
securities and other investments. Re-hypothecation occurs when the creditor (a bank or broker-dealer)
re-uses the collateral posted by the debtor (a client such as a hedge fund) to back the broker’s own
trades and borrowing. This mechanism also enables leverage in the securities market.
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